Friday, November 29, 2013

Twins Fans, Meet Ricky Nolasco

The Twins have signed Ricky Nolasco to a four-year, $49 million contract, the largest in team history. Twins fans may be unfamiliar with a pitcher who's toiled for fairly anonymous Marlins teams most of his career. Here's what you need to know.

What's Good About Him? A few things:

  • He was pretty good last year: 13-11, 3.70 ERA split between the Marlins and the Dodgers.
  • He's durable. Over the past six seasons, he's started 186 games, which ties him for 19th among all pitchers.
  • By some key measures, he's been pretty effective. He's struck out 17.1% of the batters he's faced over the past three seasons, walked 5.4%, and allowed homers to 2.2%. Last year the Twins' ratios were 15.7%, 7.3%, and 2.7%. So he's likely to get more strikeouts and allow fewer walks and homers than the typical Twins pitcher last year (granted, a low bar).

What's Not So Good About Him? Over the past three seasons, there have been only eight pitchers with 475+ innings who walked fewer than 2.2 batters per nine innings, struck out 6.6 or more, and gave up fewer then 0.9 homers. Here they are:
Player ERA BB/9 SO/9 HR/9 BAbip IP GS W L H R ER BB SO
Clayton Kershaw 2.21 2.18 9.15 0.54 .266 697.0 99 51 23 508 191 171 169 709
Jered Weaver 2.77 2.15 7.11 0.89 .253 578.2 87 49 21 468 186 178 138 457
Cliff Lee 2.80 1.38 9.01 0.89 .298 666.1 93 37 25 597 222 207 102 667
Jordan Zimmermann 3.12 1.80 6.91 0.77 .287 570.1 90 39 28 532 212 198 114 438
David Price 3.13 2.16 8.31 0.78 .289 622.0 92 42 26 543 234 216 149 574
Cole Hamels 3.15 2.02 8.46 0.88 .285 651.1 95 39 29 564 242 228 146 612
Doug Fister 3.30 1.81 6.78 0.61 .301 586.2 89 35 32 578 240 215 118 442
Ricky Nolasco 4.29 2.07 6.61 0.83 .321 596.1 97 35 36 653 307 284 137 438
Generated 11/29/2013.

Do you see the problem? Those are six All-Stars, a solid if unheralded pitcher in Fister...plus Ricky Nolasco. His ERA is almost a full run higher than everybody else's. More than two runs higher than Kershaw's.

Note that I added a column, BAbip. That's batting average on balls in play: how he does on at-bats that don't end in a strikeout or homer. Nolasco's .321 is the worst on the list. It's also worse than the NL average of .297. So while Nolasco does a good job keeping the ball in the park and avoiding free passes, when batters make non-homer contact, they get hits off him. That's why he's had such a lackluster ERA.

So What Should Twins Fans Expect? Nolasco has given up too many hits (9.9 per nine innings over the past three years, 1.2 more than the NL average) and runs to be a top pitcher, negating his fine control and anti-homer skills. Having strong up-the-middle defense should help him some, though he doesn't get an above-average number of ground balls that the double play combo of Florimon and Dozier will turn into outs, nor fly balls that Aaron Hicks will chase down. I'd expect an average or slightly better-than-average ERA and 200 or so innings, but nothing spectacular.

For a more detailed analysis, check out Twins blogger Aaron Gleeman's take.

Monday, November 25, 2013

Coors Field: Easy on Hitters or Tough on Pitchers?

Coors Field, home of the Colorado Rockies, is the best hitters' park in the majors. The new Bill James Handbook gives it a Park Factor of 127 for run scoring, which means that 27% more runs were scored in Rockies games at Coors than elsewhere last year. And this isn't a surprise. Denver, as you may have heard, is a mile high. The higher the altitude, the thinner the air, and the better a baseball carries. This is Physics 101. Fly balls and line drives at Coors go farther, inflating offense.

I thought that was the whole story, but recently, while listening to MLB Network Radio on SiriusXM, one of the morning hosts, former major leaguer Todd Hollandsworth, said that pitchers are challenged additionally because their secondary pitches don't have as much movement. In other words, everything pitchers throw other than a fastball is straighter at Coors. That makes it more hittable, and forces pitchers to rely more on their fastball, which hitters can time better...all bad. 

I hadn't heard the pitch movement theory before, so I decided to test it. We can do that now. Every pitch in the majors is recorded: its speed, whether it's a strike or a ball, whether it's hit, and, relevant to this question, how much it moves.

Specifically, the system, called PITCHf/x, is a set of cameras installed at every stadium that measures, among other things, the horizontal and vertical movement of every pitch. I looked up the logs of every game pitched by the Rockies' principal starters and checked how much their non-fastball pitches moved, home and away. (The source for all data in this article is Brooks Baseball.) For example, the Rockies' No. 1 starter was Jhoulys Chacin (31 games started, 14-10, 3.47 ERA, 1.26 WHIP). His main secondary pitch is a sinking fastball. In 18 home starts, he threw 449 sinkers. In 13 road starts, he threw 388. At home, Chacin's sinker moved, on average, 0.94 fewer inches horizontally and dropped 1.31 fewer inches vertically. Here's the whole story on what Coors did to Chacin's secondary pitches:

Pitch Type   # Home/Away  Horizontal Impact   Vertical Impact
Sinker         449/388        -0.94              -1.31
Slider         420/289        -2.22              -0.45
Changeup       166/92         -1.15              -1.01
Curveball       37/70         -2.50              -2.02
The impact is the change in inches between Coors and road games. A negative number means less movement, a positive number means more. Looking at these numbers, the thin air appears to make it harder to get side-to-side movement and to make balls sink, at least for Chacin. Let's check the rest of the staff:

Juan Nicasio (31 GS, 9-9, 5.14 ERA, 1.47 WHIP)
Pitch Type   # Home/Away  Horizontal Impact   Vertical Impact
Slider         255/310        -0.84              -1.95
Sinker          37/170        -0.56              +0.50
Changeup        85/88         -0.36              -0.78

Jorge de la Rosa (30 GS, 16-6, 3.49 ERA, 1.38 WHIP)
Pitch Type   # Home/Away  Horizontal Impact   Vertical Impact
Splitter       400/380        -2.13              -0.42
Slider         190/206        +0.09              -0.83
Sinker          89/99         -2.89              -1.71
Curveball       65/118        -0.36              -2.10

Tyler Chatwood (20 GS, 8-5, 3.15 ERA, 1.43 WHIP)
Pitch Type   # Home/Away  Horizontal Impact   Vertical Impact
Sinker         420/314        -1.75              -1.14
Curveball      121/94         -1.38              -2.99
Slider         126/84         -0.97              -1.72
Changeup        32/34         -1.76              -0.68

Jon Garland (12 GS, 4-6, 5.82 ERA, 1.59 WHIP) 
Pitch Type   # Home/Away  Horizontal Impact   Vertical Impact
Sinker         145/161        -0.72              -1.51
Cut Fastball   116/66         +0.69              -1.52
Curveball       65/90         -3.33              -2.04
Changeup        49/47         -0.61              -1.71

Jeff Francis (12 GS, 3-5, 6.27 ERA, 1.61 WHIP)
Pitch Type   # Home/Away  Horizontal Impact   Vertical Impact
Sinker         283/219        -1.37              -0.95
Curveball      138/80         -1.09              -0.83
Changeup       121/64         -1.01              -0.78
Cut Fastball    62/24         -0.89              -0.39

What can we learn from this? I'd say four things:
  1. There sure are a lot of negative numbers in the horizontal column! Coors does appear to impair side-to-side movement on pitches.
  2. Same with the vertical column. Pitches thrown at Coors stay up in the strike zone more. That's not necessarily bad with some pitches, which are designed to stay high, like a fastball. But a curveball that doesn't drop is a slow pitch in the middle of the strike zone. 
  3. The least affected is were Juan Nicasio and Jeff Francis, who lost an inch or less of movement on most pitches. They didn't have particularly dominant seasons, though. It's not like they cracked the code.
  4. I'm definitely paying more attention to Todd Hollandsworth going forward, because he nailed this one. Coors definitely helps batted balls carry, but it also makes it harder for pitchers to get movement on the pitches, making the hitters' job easier still.


Friday, November 22, 2013

Sixty Years Ago

Some of you many know this, but until the 1950s, it was standard practice for fielders to leave their gloves on the field when they returned to the dugout to bat. This created the obvious problems of batted balls hitting gloves and fielders tripping over them. It's hard for me to envision the whole concept.

It seems that every innovation in baseball is met with resistance, whether it's the DH or instant replay. But wouldn't you think that something that makes sense, like not leaving gloves on the field, would be accepted by acclimation?

Think again. As this article from BaseballHistoryBlog.com explains, the requirement to remove gloves from the field was initially opposed. Several minor leagues said they wouldn't enforce it. The Commissioner and the president of the National Association (which governed the minor leagues; it's known as Minor League Baseball today) had to issue "sharp warnings" to address the "widespread dissatisfaction" over the change. 

The concern was that requiring players to take their gloves with them to the dugout would "delay games and encourage stalling." I am trying to figure out how that makes any sense at all. Still working on it.

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Designated Hitter: Part-Time or Full-Time?

I listen the Baseball Prospectus "Effectively Wild" podcast during the week. The two hosts, Ben Lindbergh and Sam Miller of BP, cover a couple topics each day in a short podcast that is perfect as a walking-the-dog accompaniment. I don't know about you, but I often wait to listen to podcasts untill I have a batch of them cued up, then I listen back-to-back. Effectively Wild's my exception to that rule. I usually listen to it the same day I download it. It's that good.

Anyway, Sam and Ben were recently talking about the DH. You know that David Ortiz was World Series MVP. You also know that when the Red Sox were in St. Louis, they had to bench Mike Napoli and move Ortiz to first. Sam and Ben wondered whether the advantage of a full-time DH is countered by a lack of roster flexibility. The Yankees, for example, had Travis Hafner as their DH for 72 games but otherwise used the position to rehab or rest convalescing players--16 games for Alex Rodriguez, 15 for Curtis Granderson, four for Derek Jeter, etc. The lack of a full-time DH allowed the Yankees to use the position as needed given what was going on with their roster, giving them more flexibility. Actually, the Yankees, whose DHs were last in batting (.189), on base percentage (.276), AND slugging (.307) are probably not the best example of this approach. To find out which strategy's better--full-time or part-time DH--I ranked every team's DH position by OPS and then checked out how many games their primary DH played. Here's the list:
Rk BA OBP SLG OPS ▾ Primary DH, Games
1 BOS .310 .398 .560 .958 David Ortiz, 129
2 KCR .290 .377 .412 .789 Billy Butler, 150
3 SEA .265 .333 .448 .781 Kendrys Morales, 122
4 DET .302 .354 .425 .779 Victor Martinez, 139
5 TOR .253 .347 .425 .772 Adam Lind, 61
6 LAA .264 .341 .414 .754 Albert Pujols, 65
7 CLE .239 .340 .414 .753 Jason Giambi, 58
8 BAL .234 .289 .415 .704 Danny Valencia, 42
9 OAK .230 .309 .389 .698 Seth Smith, 55
10 TEX .245 .313 .385 .698 Lance Berkman, 65
11 TBR .214 .307 .373 .680 Luke Scott, 63
12 CHW .219 .290 .384 .674 Adam Dunn, 74
13 MIN .214 .294 .341 .634 Ryan Doumit, 49
14 HOU .198 .276 .337 .613 Chris Carter, 47
15 NYY .189 .276 .307 .583 Travis Hafner, 72
Generated 11/18/2013.

Wow. That's pretty stark. Four teams had a DH that played regularly. Those four teams got the most out of the position. Simple as that.

Except it's not. I looked at the prior five seasons, 2008-2012, and calculated the correlation between games played by each AL team's primary DH and the team's DH OPS. It turns out that there is no correlation at all. None (correlation coefficient = -0.01). The most DH production during those five years was from the 2011 Red Sox, who had Ortiz for 135 games. But the leading team in 2012 was the Yankees, who got fewer games out of their primary DH than any team in that period:
Rk G AB R H 2B 3B HR RBI BB SO BA OBP SLG OPS
1 Melky Mesa 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1.000 1.000 1.000 2.000
2 Andruw Jones 18 38 4 11 4 0 3 10 6 9 .289 .378 .632 1.009
3 Robinson Cano 9 32 6 9 1 0 3 5 4 6 .281 .378 .594 .972
4 Derek Jeter 25 103 18 40 5 0 3 12 10 18 .388 .439 .524 .963
5 Raul Ibanez 28 92 16 26 5 0 7 22 8 18 .283 .340 .565 .905
6 Nick Swisher 12 47 8 13 3 0 3 11 6 15 .277 .370 .532 .902
7 Eric Chavez 19 54 9 15 2 0 3 7 9 10 .278 .375 .481 .856
8 Alex Rodriguez 38 150 22 46 9 0 5 20 14 38 .307 .371 .467 .837
9 Russell Martin 4 11 2 3 1 0 0 2 2 4 .273 .385 .364 .748
10 Eduardo Nunez 5 13 2 4 1 0 0 3 0 1 .308 .286 .385 .670
11 Jayson Nix 3 6 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 .167 .286 .333 .619
12 Mark Teixeira 4 17 3 2 0 0 2 4 0 5 .118 .118 .471 .588
13 Curtis Granderson 1 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 .000 .250 .000 .250
14 Steve Pearce 2 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 .000 .167 .000 .167
15 Casey McGehee 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 .000 .000 .000 .000
16 Ichiro Suzuki 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 .000 .000 .000 .000
Team Total 153 583 93 171 32 0 29 100 62 132 .293 .362 .497 .860
Generated 11/18/2013.

In 2009, the Royals had a more or less full-time DH, Mike Jacobs, who was lousy: he hit .224/.296/.374 in 106 games, as Kansas City finished last with a .655 team OPS for DHs. But the next year, the Mariners mix-and-matched (nobody more than 52 games) to a last-place .194/.269/.340 line, which in turn wasn't as bad as this year's Yankees, who had no DH appear in over half their games. 

So what's the conclusion? There really isn't one, in terms of strategy. Teams with a full-time DH sometimes do great, and sometimes do poorly. Teams that use the position as a combination gym and respite site sometimes do great, sometimes do poorly. The lack of positional flexibility is outweighed by performance when you have a good full-time DH, but isn't when you don't. It all depends on the personnel.

I suppose the next step would be to see how AL teams with a full-time DH fare in the Series compared to AL teams that don't. Another day.